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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellant is from a final order of the Labor
Commission of Utah dated July 16, 2003, Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration, and encompasses the Labor Commission's Order Denying
Motion for Review, dated May 1, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and
78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue:

Whether the Commission properly found that Ms. Giles failed

to meet her burden of establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, that she
is entitled to worker's compensation benefits under the applicable
Occupational Disease Act as a result of her work with TAD during the period
of September 1985 to October 1990. This issue was preserved at R. 345-70
and throughout record.
Standard

of Review:

This matter involves the

Commission's

determination of medical causation which is an issue of fact which appellate
courts will review under the "substantial evidence standard". See Chase v.
Industrial Common. 872 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code Ann.
§§63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence

1

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion/'
The appellate court will sustain the Commission's factual determination
concerning medical causation only if its finding is adequately supported by
the record. See id.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The relevant statute at issue in Ms. Giles' claim against TAD is the
1990 version of the Last Employer Liable Rule, Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14
(1990) which provides in relevant part:
Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease the only
employer liable shall be the employer in whose employment the
employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease

Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990). l
1

Unlike the general rule in Utah - where court's apply the substantive
law in effect when the action was initiated (i.e., the date the claim was filed),
- the proper law to be applied in workers' compensation matters is the law
"as it existed at the time of the injury." Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 704
P.2d 581 (Utah 1985); Smith v. Mitv Lite, 939 P.2d 684, n . l (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (courts must apply "the law at the time of the initial injury").
Although Utah's appellate courts have not specifically articulated this rule
in the context of occupational diseases, the same premise should apply.
That is, in occupational disease claims, the Commission must apply the law
in effect when the worker was injured, or in occupational disease terms,
when the worker suffered an "injurious exposure" to the disease-causing
agent(s).
For Ms. Giles to successfully prevail against TAD, she must show an
injurious exposure during the course of her employment with TAD
Accordingly, she must show that her injurious exposure occurred sometime
between September 1985 and October 1990, the dates during which she
2

Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-27 (1990), defines the requirement
for proof of an occupational diseases as follows:
For the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated in this
section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases:

(28) Such other diseases or injuries to health which
directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure occasioned
by the employment, provided however, that such a disease or
injury to health shall be compensable only in those instances
where it is shown by the employee or his dependents that all of
the follow named circumstances were present: (1) a direct
causal connection between the conditions under which the work
is performed and the disease or injury to health; (2) the disease
or injury to health can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident fo the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the employment; (3) the disease or injury to health can be fairly
traced to the employment as to the proximate cause; (4) the
disease or injury to health is not of a character to which the
employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the
employment; (5) the disease or injury to health is incidental to
the character fo the business and not independent of the
relation of the employer and employee; and (6) the disease or
injury to health must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment and to have flowed from that
source as a natural consequence, though it need not have been
foreseen or expected before discovery. No disease or injury to
health shall be found compensable where it is of a character to
which the general public is commonly exposed.
Id.

was employed by TAD. Since she was not employed with in 1991, that
statute does not apply in her claims against TAD.
3

The ALJ's Order incorrectly lists the 1991 version of this statute. 2 See
R., 343.
With regard to medical causation, Utah's appellate courts have also
stated that a "claimant must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that
the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the
resulting injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986).

2

The ALJ incorrectly referenced Utah Code Ann. §35-2-107 (1991) in
his analysis which provides:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational
disease is defined as any disease or illness which arises out of
and in the course of employment and is medically caused or
aggravated by employment.
Id. However, the application of the 1991 version of this statute is harmless
error since, by its terms, this statute requires an injured worker to show
substantially less by way of her burden of proof.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents a question of whether Ms. Giles is entitled to
worker's compensation benefits from various defendants, in particular, TAD
Technical Services Corporation and its workers' compensation carrier,
Liberty Mutual Insurance.

She files an appeal from the Utah Labor

Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review and Order Denying Motion
for Reconsideration.
Course of the Proceedings
With respect to the legal proceedings Ms. Giles has filed against TAD
Technical Services Corporation (also known as "Adecco") and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, the following course of events have ensued:
On December 27, 2000 Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing
seeking worker's compensation benefits from Oakridge Country Club and
the Worker's Compensation Fund.

See R., 96-117.

Ms. Giles claimed

"chemically induced porphyria" as a result of exposure to "numerous toxic
fumes and materials" during the course of her employment with this
employer from May 1991 to December 1991. 3 See R., 98.
3

A prior action was filed on May 30, 1992 against Oakridge Country
Club and/or the Worker's Compensation Fund for exposure to chlorine gas
on September 7, 1991. See R., 1-95. That case, Case No. 92-693 resulted
in a resolution by way of settlement agreement.
5

On that same date, Ms. Giles filed a motion with the Labor
Commission requesting that an administrative law judge with no ties to the
Labor Commission be assigned to hear this occupational disease case. See
R., 96. Her request stemmed from her belief that a Commission ALJ would
not fairly adjudicate her claim due to a previous result she obtained in her
prior workers' compensation case.
On February 22, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Richard LaJeunesse
denied her motion. Judge La Jeunesse stated: "The Labor Commission is
the only agency that has jurisdiction to hear workers compensation cases.
Therefore, it is not possible to even entertain your request that a judge
outside the Labor Commission hear your case." See R., 121.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001 Ms. Giles requested joinder of TAD
and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance, to this occupational disease
claim.

(Collectively, "TAD"). See R., 133. She did so in an attempt to

obtain possible apportionment attributable to TAD under what she believed
was the applicable statute - Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-105 (1991). 4
On May 14, 2001, the Labor Commission sent an Amended Request
for Answer to TAD and Liberty Mutual. See R., 195. On J u n e 8, 2001 TAD
filed an Answer and a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R., 340-70. In
4

As noted infra, the applicable statute appropriate to her claim
against TAD is Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990).
6

the Motion for Summary Judgment TAD asserted: (1) Ms. Giles failed to
meet certain statute of limitation requirements with respect to the filing of
her claim; (2) Ms. Giles claim fails for lack of medical evidence to support
her claim against TAD; and, (3) the last injurious exposure rule of section
35-2-14(1990) bars all liability against TAD. See id. Thereafter, Ms. Giles
filed a response. See R., 375-85.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, Ms. Giles submitted a request for
reconsideration of the ALJ's denial of an independent ALJ to hear her case.
See R., 129.

On J u n e 11, 2001, the Labor Commission issued an Order

Denying Reconsideration of an independent ALJ. See R., 373. On July 13,
2001, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals.
See R.. 416-17.
On July 18, 2001, TAD filed a reply memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment. R., 421-34.
On July 23, 2001, TAD filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal with the
Utah Court of Appeals. See R., 450-76. The Court of Appeals issued a
decision on December 6, 2001 ruling that because there was no final order,
Ms. Giles' appeal was barred for lack of jurisdiction. See R., 686-87. Her
petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court was denied. See R., 702.

7

On J u n e 6, 2002, Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse issued his
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the
"Order"). See R., 720-35. In the Order, the ALJ granted TAD's summary
judgment motion, ruling that Ms. Giles failed in her burden of establishing
medical causation.

The ALJ's Order did not address the other grounds

raised in TAD's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On July 8, 2002, Ms. Giles filed a Motion for Review. TAD filed a
response on July 25, 2002. See R., 851-68.

On August 30, 2002, Ms.

Giles filed an additional Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Review.
See R., 884.
On May 1, 2003 the Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for
Review. See R., 1030-36. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's position with
regard to TAD's liability, ruling that Ms. Giles was unable to produce
evidence that her work at TAD exposed her to chemicals that caused or
contributed to her porphyria.
On May 2 1 , 2003, Ms. Giles filed a Request for Reconsideration. See
R., 1037-1120. TAD filed a response to this motion on J u n e 3, 2003. See
R., 1129-38. Petitioner filed her response on J u n e 16, 2003. See R., 114969. On July 16, 2003 the Commission entered its Order Denying Request
for Reconsideration. See R., 1231-35.

8

On July 16, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Petition for Review. See R., 123637. She filed an Amended Petition for Review on July 23, 2003. See R.,
1239-40.
On August 7, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Docketing Statement.
On August 27, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Motion to Direct the Labor
Commission to Supplement the Record Index and Motion to Stay the Filing
Deadline for Appellant's Brief Until the Record is Complete 5 . On September
26, 2003 the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order on this motion.
On November 6, 2003, the Utah Labor Commission entered a Briefing
Order.
On November 21, 2003 Ms. Giles filed a Memorandum Regarding
Supplementation of the Record. On December 2, 2003 TAD filed a response
to this motion.
On February 19, 2004 the Commission issued its Determination
Regarding Giles' Request to Supplement Record.
On March 3, 2004 Ms. Giles filed a Motion Requesting Court of
Appeals to Review the Labor Commissions Determination Regarding Record
and Motion to Stay the Filing Deadline for Appellant's Brief Until Review is
Completed and Issues Regarding Record are Resolved. TAD filed a response

5

Citations to the record are not available for these ensuing events.
9

to this motion on March 8, 2004. Ms. Giles filed a reply on March 18, 2004.
On March 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued its Order denying Ms. Giles
motion and set a 30-day appellate briefing schedule for April 22, 2004. 6
Ms. Giles' brief was submitted to the Court of Appeals on May 2 1 ,
2004.
Statement of Facts
Ms. Giles worked as a secretary for TAD from September 1985 to
October of 1990. See R., 354. She believes that during this employment
she was exposed to multiple toxic fumes and substances contributing to her
porphyria. She cannot recall with any certainty the substances to which
she might have been exposed, the length of exposure, or the quantity of
exposure.
Ms. Giles next began working for Oakridge Country Club beginning
around J u n e 1, 1991 to December 19 th of that year.
On about J u n e 9, 1992 Ms. Giles filed an Application for Hearing
claiming injury on September 7, 1991 at Oakridge which she described as
"chlorine gas exposure." See R., 1-95. A hearing on that case was held on
J a n u a r y 4, 1993. See R., 36. The ALJ ruled that Ms. Giles did not meet

6

Ms. Giles has filed a plethora of other motions which are not
referenced in this brief as TAD does not believe they are relevant for
purposes of this appeal.
10

her burden of proof and denied her claim. See id. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Review and Motion for Reconsideration which were both denied. See R.,
50-54.

She sought review with the Utah Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, Ms. Giles continued to seek a medical diagnosis of
her alleged condition. On January 5, 1995 Dr. Baker diagnosed her injury
as "chemically acquired or chemically induced porphyria" from exposure to
toxic fumes at Oakridge.

See R., 367-69.

Dr. Baker described this

condition as follows:
The porphyrias are a group of diseases of heme synthesis
in which the over production of prophyrian compounds result
from deficient enzyme activity in the biosynthetic pathway of
heme...
Without attempting to separately describe each different
porphyria, general symptoms of the acute attack may include
abdominal pain... nausea, vomiting,...diarrhea. Neurological
symptoms... may include peripheral neuropathy, weakness, ...
sensory disorder, possible respiratory problems, hallucinations,
confusion, depression, sometimes even seizures.
In summary, then, Glenda Giles has developed porphyria
as a result of exposure to toxic materials at work at a country
club. In addition to be (sic) exposed to chlorine, she was
exposed to extensive materials in remodeling including
carpeting. She did notice in this area and she consistently
better away from this area.
Tests at the Mayo clinic do indicate that she does have
porphyria. It is highly unlikely that she had this previously as
she does have a triple enzyme defect, and the hereditary forms
of porphyria usually will have one enzyme defect.

11

R., 367-69.
Oakridge continued to dispute liability; however, a compromise
settlement was eventually reached and was approved by the Labor
Commission. Under this settlement, Ms. Giles is entitled to receive lifetime
benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") based upon her
claim of being permanently and totally disabled as a result of her claimed
exposure on September 7, 1991. See R., 360.
On December 27, 2000 Ms. Giles filed a second Application for
Hearing, the present action, seeking worker's compensation benefits from
Oakridge Country Club and the Worker's Compensation Fund. See R., 98.
This second action was based on the same condition, porphyria, that served
as the basis of her first claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. Ms.
Giles h a s claimed to have contracted "chemically induced porphyria" as a
result of exposure to "numerous toxic fumes and materials" during the
course of her employ with this employer from May 1991 to December 1991.
See id.

Despite the fact that she is already receiving permanent total

disability benefits from ERF, Ms. Giles is claiming that she is, somehow,
entitled to yet additional permanent total disability benefits as a result of
her claimed porphyria.

12

Ms. Giles requested joinder of TAD and its insurer, Liberty Mutual
Insurance, to this occupational disease claim; however, Ms. Giles did not
submit any evidence of exposure to substances at TAD that caused or
contributed to her porphyria. See R., 133.
Ms. Giles also requested the Labor Commission to assign an ALJ to
her case who was independent of any Labor Commission ties. See R., 96.
That request was denied by the ALJ, and later affirmed by the Commission.
Although she appealed this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, that review
was denied given the lack of a final order.
Ms. Giles' case against TAD was eventually decided by way of
Summary Judgment by Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse. The ALJ
ruled that because Ms. Giles did not meet her burden of medical causation,
she had failed to meet her burden of proof. The ALJ ruled:
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her
exposure to any porphyric substances while employed at Adecco
remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time, and place of
any such exposure. At best, Ms. Giles can only express her
belief as to the type of substance her employment at Adecco
exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying
with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details
concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that
[she] did not know to what extent her exposures while employed
by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused
her porphyria.
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against
Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a hedge against
13

apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms.
Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her
means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with
apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked a means to
prove by preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria
arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco,
her claim must be dismissed.
R., 720-35.
The Commission affirmed the ALJ's ruling on the same grounds. The
issue of medical causation being dispositive, neither the ALJ nor the
Commission ruled on the other grounds for dismissal raised in TAD's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

See R., 1030-36.

Ms. Giles has consistently reiterated that she does not know all of the
chemicals and fumes to which she might have been exposed while in TAD's
employ. Ms. Giles has speculated as to such substances in her Response
to Memorandum in Support of Respondent Adecco's Motion for Summary
Judgment, but has stated that she cannot recall the substances to which
she might have been exposed at TAD, the length of exposure, the dates of
exposure, the quantity of fumes to which she might have been exposed, the
source of each fume, and the identity of the toxic materials.

14

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because Ms. Giles claims exposure to toxic substances in the course
of employment with TAD which employment ended in 1990, the 1990
version of Utah law applies in this case. Under the applicable statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 35-2-14 (1990), no apportionment is allowed against TAD since
Oakridge was the last employer during the period of last injurious exposure.
However, as the Commission correctly ruled in its Order Denying
Motion for Review, Ms. Giles has not submitted any medical evidence
showing exposure to toxic substances during the course of her employment
with TAD. Indeed, she has admitted in several instances that she cannot
recall the times, or places, or even the names of the substances to which
she was allegedly exposed. Certainly, no employer can defend itself from
such a vague and unsubstantiated claim. Thus, the Commission correctly
denied her claim against TAD for lack of medical causation.

15

ARGUMENT7
MS. GILES FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF PROVING
MEDICAL CAUSATION
Ms. Giles submits that the Commission incorrectly granted TAD's
Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 Her brief provides little by way of actual
argument to substantiate this point. Nonetheless, TAD asserts that the ALJ
and the Commission correctly denied benefits to Ms. Giles for her alleged
occupational disease against TAD given her failure to submit medical
evidence attributing her porphyria to her employment with TAD.
The Commission began its analysis by stating the correct legal
standard: summary judgment may be granted only when no genuine issues

7

TAD addresses only those legally relevant and factually supported
issues that directly pertain to the appeal against TAD.
Ms. Giles also makes allegations of bias against the ALJ, the
Commission and the adjudication process. These assertions are simply
unfounded and not supported by substantial evidence. In any event, she
has failed to marshall the evidence on this matter, and on most issues
raised in her brief, as required by law.
8

She spends much time in point IV of her brief asserting why TAD's
Motion for Summary Judgment was not correctly considered under 12(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, section 63-46b-l(4)(b) states
that the court may grant a timely motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are met. Given that TAD filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, there was no need for the court to consider Rule 12(b), and the
defenses raised in that rule, as a basis for its ruling.
16

of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l(4); Harper v. Summit
County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Commission and ALJ both
agreed, as does TAD, that even when considered in a light most favorable
to Ms. Giles, Ms. Giles has failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact regarding TAD's liability in this matter. She provides no challenge to
this point on appeal.
Turning to whether TAD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
the ALJ and Commission both ruled that Ms. Giles did not submit any
evidence with her Application for Hearing to establish, by a preponderance
of evidence, that her work at TAD during the stated period exposed her to
chemicals that medically caused or contributed to her diagnosed porphyria.
The ALJ stated on this point:
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107 (1991) provided that:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational
disease is defined as any disease or illness which arises out of and in
the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by
that employment.
Ms. Giles as the petitioner in the present matter carried
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
porphyria arose out of and in the course of her employment with
Adecco. [see gen: Ashcroft v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Ut App. 1993) (petitioner's burden of
proof by preponderance of the evidence)]. Ms. Giles also bore

17

the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
employment at Adecco medically caused her porphyria.
The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this
case, and taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Giles,
established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure
to toxic materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any
prior industrial exposure. Accordingly, Ms. Giles' own medical
evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles'
porphyria, [see gen: Stevenson v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah* 641 P.2d 117 (Utah 1982).
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her
exposure to any porphyric substances while employed at Adecco
remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time, and place of
any such exposure. At best, Ms. Giles can only express her
belief as to the type of substance her employment at Adecco
exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying
with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details
concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that
[she] did not know to what extend her exposures while employed
by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused
her porphyria.
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case [was] against
Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a hedge against
apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms.
Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her
means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with
apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked a means to
prove by preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria
arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco
her claim must be dismissed.
R., 733.
Although the ALJ incorrectly referenced Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107
(1991) as the applicable statute, rather than Utah. Code Ann. § 35-2-27(28)
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(1990), that reference is essentially harmless error since the ALJ and
Commission found that even under this more lenient statute, the claimant
failed in her burden of medical causation. Certainly, if the Commission and
ALJ had properly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-27(28) (1990) to this case,
Ms. Giles would have been required to show not only that the claimed
disease arose as a natural incident to exposure occasioned by employment
(i.e., the medical causation standard), 9 but also, the following six
requirements:
(1)

a direct causal connection between the conditions under which
the work is performed and the disease or injury to health;

(2)

the disease or injury to health can be seen to have followed as
a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure
occasioned by the employment;

(3)

the disease or injury to health can be fairly traced to the
employment as to the proximate cause;

(4)

the disease or injury to health is not of a character to which the
employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the
employment;

(5)

the disease or injury to health is incidental to the character of
the business and not independent of the relation of the
employer and employee; and

9

This is akin to the arising out of and in the course of employment
requirement found in the 1991 statute and its successors. Historically,
and presently, the arising out of and in the course of employment
requirement in the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts
encompass the elements of medical and legal causation.
19

(6)

the disease or injury to health must appear to have had its
origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have
flowed from that source as a natural consequence, though it
need not have been foreseen or expected before discovery.

Utah Code Ann. §35-2-27(28) (1990).
Utah's appellate courts have interpreting the arising out of
requirement in this statute and its successors, to require proof of medical
causation. This requires that a "claimant . . . show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Absent such evidence, the claimant's
case fails.
Ms. Giles has not met the necessary statutory and case law
requirements to establish a medical causal connection between her
porphyria and her work at TAD. The evidence in this case reveals that Ms.
Giles' claimed porphyria resulted from, if anything, her exposure to
substances at Oakridge Country Club - for which she is already receiving
permanent total disability benefits. 10

On January 5, 1995, Dr. Gordon

Baker indicated that Petitioner "was in good health until she began working

10

In this regard, Respondents herein submit that Ms. Giles cannot be
more permanently and totally disabled as a result of her present condition.
Rather, she can claim entitlement only once to permanent total disability
benefits.
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at the Oakridge Country Club." See R., xxi i ^ . ^ . Baker also indicated
that "Glenda Giles has developed porphyria as a result of exposure to '• ,>xic
f

work at a country clu b." ..••.c^ic*.

i >ti.kcv states that:

Tests al the Mayo Clinic do indicate she does have porph^ i ia.
It is highly unlikely that she had this previously as she does
have a triple enzyme defect, and the hereditary forms of
porphyria will have one enzyme defect.
Id,
]\/] •

-

evidence oi exposure tu
en ploved h\ TAb.

..: - ,, :\

- ::\-M •

*. • "

'

... •, L a n y

• <•'"*•

e

Rather, the evidence she presented supports the

position triai *AC was exposed t~ noxious chemicals in September 1991.
:

b i c e.g. •

i}

vas employed l)v Oakndge

Country Club.
Additionally, Ms. Giles explicitly stated on several occasions that she
has no evidence showing exposure to toxic substances during the course of
1,11

"' 'Mnploymrnt ,tl I 'il1

I" h'1" irspouses ',' I \l)i. InLei rogatories she

stated as followrs:
21.

Please identify each ,m." even' toxic fume \ou :laim you
were exposed \o during your employment with Adeeco. . .
:: icse exposures occurrv-u ji< *,a to sixteen years ci&u, and
it is impossible for Petitioner, at this late date, to compile
a list of each exposure; on what dates or dates they

occurred; the length of time of exposure; the quantity of
fume exposed to; the source or sources of each fume; and,
the precise location of each exposure to such fume.
Petitioner was exposed to toxic fumes on a daily basis, but
has no way of knowing the identity of all the toxic
materials she was exposed to. . . . Petitioner did not work
with any of the toxic substances.
R., at 433 (Emphasis added.). She has affirmed this position similarly in
other pleadings to the Labor Commission. See, e.g. R., 375-85, 398-08.
Because Petitioner has failed to submit any evidence to support her
claim against TAD, she has not met her burden of proof. Accordingly, these
Respondents request this court to affirm the Commission's ruling and
dismiss her claim with prejudice. 11

Hxi

In any event, even if Ms. Giles could meet her burden of medical
causation against TAD, because §35-2-14 (1990) does not permit
apportionment against former employers, TAD has no liability in this
instance.
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CONCLUSION
"li
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Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review was properly
-
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employment with TAD,
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